Responsa על בבא קמא 123:15

Q. A deposited with B for safe-keeping a strongbox well locked up. Subsequently, B broke open the box and left it open. When A came for his box and found it open, he charged that several silver vessels and other valuables were missing. B admitted having opened the box, but said that he abstracted therefrom a single silver vessel because he had gone surety for A and needed the money in order to extricate himself therewith from the entanglements of that obligation.
A. A is to be held responsible for all articles that, according to B's assertion under oath, are missing from the strongbox, provided such articles are usually kept in a strongbox of this type, for the ordinance for the benefit of the robbed person [that the latter take an oath as to the extent of the damage he has suffered, and collect full compensation therefor], applies also to other, similar, damagees. (B.K. 62a).
SOURCES: Cr. 201; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 268b; Sinai VII (1943), 5–6, 49.

Q. A demanded from B sixty pennies he owed him. B admitted the indebtedness, but claimed that through A's wilful neglect, he, B, was not able to collect a debt of four pounds and sixty pennies. B, therefore, demanded that A pay him four pounds. The judges ordered A to swear that he did not willfully cause any damage to B, and ordered B to swear that A did willfully cause him a loss of at least sixty pennies. After the judges rendered this decision, B put forth his claim that, in partnership with A, he, B, loaned eight and one half pounds to Gentiles, and that, without his permission or consent, A relinquished that debt to the Gentiles. A, however, claimed that B gave him permission to do with B's share whatever he would do with his own. Moreover, A claims that B informed against him; a Jewish witness, the servants of the Bishop, and the burghers, support A's claim in this respect. The judges, however, demand that their former decision be carried out and that A and B present their new claims in another suit.
A. The decision of the judges that A must take an oath to the effect that he did not cause B to lose his investment by willful neglect, is correct. But if A released B's Gentile debtors (even though B gave A a blanket permission to do with his, B's, share whatever he, A, would do with his own), A must pay B as much as B's share was worth before A released the Gentiles. B must take an oath in the presence of the Gentile witnesses that he did not inform against A, in order to counteract the testimony of the single Jewish witness.
The question is signed by R. Yedidyah b. R. Israel.
SOURCES: Cr. 52; Pr. 699; L. 373–4; Mord. B. K. 96; Rashba I, 1096; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 258a. Cf. Moses Minz, Responsa 44; Isserlein, Pesakim 209.

Q. A consented to go surety for B to a burgher. The bishop and the judge released A from his suretyship, but the burgher refused to release him, and pressed him for money by threats and false accusations, until A was forced to make a money settlement with him. A, now, demands that B indemnify him for his loss.
A. B must indemnify A for all losses he suffered through his suretyship, even if the suretyship was used as a mere pretext for extortion. This is the law throughout our kingdom and is believed to be based on an ordinance of the communities. I believe, however, that it is sound talmudic law. But, A must prove the exact amount of his loss and can not collect by merely taking an oath. Even if witnesses testify that A gave a certain sum to the burgher and told him that the money was in final settlement of his suretyship for B, A must, nevertheless, swear that the money was given for that purpose only and that the burgher refused to accept a smaller amount in settlement of his claim. Only then may he collect that sum from B. If, however, A admits that the Gentile first released him from his suretyship and then returned with threats and accusations, B is free from any obligations to A.
SOURCES: Pr. 495; Mord. B. K. 160–161; Asher, Responsa, 18, 6. Cf. ibid. 18, 7; Agudah B. K. 138; Weil, Responsa 110; Moses Minz, Responsa 44; ibid. 74b.

A. The decision of the judges that A must take an oath to the effect that he did not cause B to lose his investment by willful neglect, is correct. But if A released B's Gentile debtors (even though B gave A a blanket permission to do with his, B's, share whatever he, A, would do with his own), A must pay B as much as B's share was worth before A released the Gentiles. B must take an oath in the presence of the Gentile witnesses that he did not inform against A, in order to counteract the testimony of the single Jewish witness.
The question is signed by R. Yedidyah b. R. Israel.
SOURCES: Cr. 52; Pr. 699; L. 373–4; Mord. B. K. 96; Rashba I, 1096; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 258a. Cf. Moses Minz, Responsa 44; Isserlein, Pesakim 209.

Q. A claimed that he gave B a coat of mail and thigh plates as security for a loan. He repaid that loan, and therefore demands back his security. B answered that he received from A only a coat of mail which he was ready to return upon the latter's payment of money still due B. Upon hearing B's reply, A said to the judges that he knew that the law required them to charge B with an oath, but that B was not qualified to take an oath since he was a notorious thief and was suspected of swearing falsely. A made a public announcement that whoever knew anything that might disqualify B from taking an oath, should appear and testify before the court and the community leaders, in accordance with the Biblical injunction (Leviticus, 5, 1). Many witnesses appeared, but the testimony of only three persons was valid. One of these testified that B had stolen one pound from him; the second said that B had testified against him in a Gentile court and thus had caused him to suffer damages; and the third testified that B had bound himself by a herem to redeem his pledged horse, and had failed to do so. Since these misdemeanors had happened long ago and B might have repented since then, was the testimony of these witnesses sufficient to disqualify B from taking an oath?
A. B should be disqualified from taking an oath because of the testimony of the first and third witnesses. The Talmud (B. K. 62a) came to no conclusion regarding the trustworthiness of an informer; therefore, the testimony of the second witness is of no consequence.
SOURCES: Pr. 978.

You have rendered unfit for eating purposes meat that was not rinsed before it was salted and cooked. Your decision in this case, however, is not correct since the talmudic law requiring that meat be rinsed before salting is a requirement previous to the act (לכתחלה) which law does not render unfit for eating purposes meat that was already salted without a previous rinsing (בדיעבד).
SOURCES: Cr. 55; Pr. 992; L. 337; Rashba I, 870. Cf. Wertheimer 3; Sefer Haparnes 30.